Dynastic politicians, defined as those whose family members have also served in the same position in the past, occupy a sizable portion of offices in many parts of the world. We develop a model of how dynastic politicians with inherited political advantages affect electoral outcomes and policy choices. Our model predicts that, as compared with non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. We test the implications of the model using data from Japan between 1997 and 2007.
Introduction
It is widely known that institutional structures constrain the actions of elected officials, yet less is known about how the types of elected officials affect policy choices. As Besley (2005) and Jones and Olken (2005) point out, implicit in most of the previous work is the assumption that politicians act in a similar fashion under a certain institutional rule, no matter who they are. In other words, previous research neglects the possibility that the personal characteristics of politicians also constrain their actions in the democratic policymaking process, which then affect policies. As Key (1949, 10) notes, "the nature of the working of government depends ultimately on the men who run it. The men we elect to office and the circumstances we create that affect their work determine the nature of popular government."
Politicians differ along a variety of dimensions such as their preferences and competence (Besley, 2005) . Previous research has found that policy preferences reflected in a politician's identity such as gender and race are associated with particular policy choices (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Lublin, 1997) . The personal ideology of the members of U.S. Congress plays a pivotal role in their roll-call voting patterns (Levitt, 1996) . The political competence of politicians refers to the ability to achieve desired policies at a minimum social cost (Caselli and Morelli, 2004) and is equivalent to individual abilities required for certain nonpolitical jobs (Besley, 2005) . 1 In fact, Jones and Olken (2005) show that some national leaders have the ability to achieve a higher rate of economic growth.
This paper focuses on another dimension of personal features that characterize politicians.
Specifically, we study dynastic politicians with inherited political resources. Political positions are no longer hereditary in modern democracies, but political dynasties continue to exist. Some democracies allow for "the de facto inheritance of political power" (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder, 2009, 116) .
Dynastic politicians, whose family members have also held similar political positions in the past, 1 Besley (2005, 48) notes that political competence "could include intangible leadership skills, like persuading others in debate or inspiring trust, and also more standard analytical skills, such as spotting flaws in policy proposals."
The first part of this paper develops a model that shows when dynastic candidates with inherited electoral and bargaining advantages crowd out non-dynastic candidates and how their dynastic status affects policy decisions on distributive benefits. Our model combines the citizen candidate model (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) and the legislative bargaining model (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989) . 3 Building on the assumptions that dynastic politicians enjoy higher bargaining power and lower cost of running for office, our model predicts the following: (1) dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district than non-dynastic legislators; (2) dynastic candidates enjoy a higher probability of winning and a higher vote share; (3) dynastic legislators harm the economic performance of the districts despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring to their constituents because dynastic legislators spend the amount on a small fraction of people in the district.
The second part of the paper offers an empirical test for the predictions from the model using data on Japanese politicians. Japan is an ideal case for this study because dynastic legislators occupy a sizable portion of the Japanese parliament. Seven out of eleven prime ministers in the last two decades were a dynastic legislator. For example, Jyunnichiro Koizumi, who served as a prime minister between 2001 and 2006 had a grandparent who was a legislator in the Lower House. Shinzo
Abe is a son of Shintaro Abe who was one of the major leaders of the LDP in the 1980s. On average, 20 to 30 percent of legislators in the Lower House have been from families of political dynasties in the last few decades. In addition, detailed data on the family background of dynastic politicians as well as on fiscal transfers, election outcomes, and economic growth are available, which enables us to test the predictions of the model. Our analysis using an instrumental variable shows that dynastic politicians deliver a larger amount of distributive benefits to their districts, compared to non-dynastic 3 Our model differs from existing related models in a notable way. In a similar effort to explain the role of candidate types, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Gehlbach, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2010) use the framework of the citizen candidate model, but their models do not contain legislative bargaining. McKelvey and Riezman (1992) also study candidates with bargaining advantages using the legislative bargaining model, but they do not consider endogenous candidates. Morelli (2004) combines the citizen candidate model with the legislative bargaining model, but all candidates belong to the same type in his model, while our model considers two different types of candidates.
politicians. We also find that the presence of dynastic legislators suppresses the level of electoral competition and that dynastic legislators with abundant electoral resources lower the rate of economic growth in their districts.
The Model
This section presents a simple model of how dynastic legislators with inherited resources affect electoral competitiveness and policy choices. To simplify our discussion, we analyze the behavior of candidates and voters in a single electoral district, holding electoral outcomes in the other districts fixed. 4 In addition, we assume that there are two potential candidates in a district who decide whether to run for office. 5 One of the candidates is a dynastic candidate, while the other potential candidate is non-dynastic.
We consider a subgame perfect equilibrium. The timing of the game is described as follows:
1. The two potential candidates decide whether to run.
2.
Candidates who decide to run announce a campaign platform.
3. There is a size one continuum of voters in the district. These voters choose one of the candidates.
4. Elected legislators bargain over the distribution of benefits.
5. The legislator spends the distribution on policies.
The next subsection illustrates the details of our settings on policies and elections. The remaining subsections derive an equilibrium and draw empirical implications. See Appendix 1 for the list of variables in our model.
Setting

Policy
Our model considers a policy on the distribution of benefits. This policy is a product of bargaining in the legislature, which has an odd number of members, ≥ 3, who are elected from the districts. At the beginning of the legislative process, one of the legislators is chosen as an agenda setter with probability , where ∑ =1 = 1.
Denote as the probability that a type-j legislator becomes an agenda setter, where j is either dynastic ( ) or non-dynastic ( ), and assume that = . The value of captures the bargaining power of dynastic legislators in the legislature when the power of non-dynastic legislators is normalized to one. We assume > 1, which means > . This assumption is justifiable because dynastic legislators are in a position to inherit from their family members two resources such as (1) personal ties with major political figures in the legislative process (e.g., party leaders, bureaucrats, and special interest groups) and (2) skills and knowledge on the policy-making process.
These distinctive features of dynastic legislators allow them to ascend the party hierarchy more quickly and enjoy larger bargaining power. We call this assumption the bargaining advantage.
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The probability of being an agenda setter depends on the number of dynastic legislators in the legislature. Denote ∈ [0, − 1] as the number of dynastic legislators elected from all other districts. If the district elects a dynastic candidate, the total number of dynastic legislators in the legislature is + 1. Otherwise, the number of dynastic candidates is . Accordingly, the probability that a non-dynastic legislator becomes an agenda setter is = 1/[ + ( − 1) ]. The probability of a dynastic legislator is = /[ + ( − 1)( + 1)].
After the agenda setter proposes distribution, = ( 1 , … , ), of the pool of non-negative 
is implemented, and we assume that ̅ = ̅ ≥ 0 for all = 1, . . . , and ∑ =1 ̅ < 1. That is, the total amount of default distributions is less than the total amount of distributions proposed by the agenda setter, so it is less efficient. This is an ultimatum game with a closed rule, as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) .
The legislator spends the benefits from the approved policy in her district. Suppose that the legislator allocates the distribution to policies and , where + = in her district. Policy will benefit a size one continuum of all voters in the district, which means that the payoff for each voter is and that the sum of the payoffs for all voters is also . In contrast, policy benefits only a fraction of the voters belonging to the support group of the legislator (or only the legislator enjoys this benefit). We refer to policy as rent. We assume that = (1 − ) and = . The value of ∈ [0,1] is the ratio of rents chosen by the legislator. Denote as the expected amount of distribution delivered by a type-j legislator to the district, and as the ratio of rents chosen by a type-j legislator.
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Following Besley, Persson, and Sturn (2010) , we interpret to be a growth policy aimed at improving the socioeconomic infrastructure and expanding job opportunities in the entire district, thus leading to higher economic performance. On the other hand, is interpreted as a rent policy that cares about the economic benefits for the limited segment of the electorate in the district, making no contribution to the economic performance of the district. 8 Thus, if a legislator sets a lower , the 7 These are based on the assumption that all districts are symmetric, except for the type of legislators. 8 Besley, Persson, and Sturn (2010) suppose that policy also contributes to economic performance, but its marginal benefit on economic performance is lower than that of policy . To simplify, our model supposes that policy 's marginal benefit is zero. If and have similar positive effects on economic performance, a dynastic legislator achieves higher economic performance than does a non-dynastic legislator, regardless of the type of district. However, if a rent policy is sufficiently inefficient (i.e., its marginal effect on economic performance is sufficiently lower than the effect of a growth policy), the results do not change. Thus, to simplify, we suppose that a rent policy makes no contribution to economic performance. distributive benefits she delivers to the district have a larger (and supposedly positive) effect on the economic performance of the district. Conversely, a higher value of means the distributive benefits contribute less to the economic performance of the entire district.
Election
We consider an election in which a winner is decided by a plurality rule, with ties being settled using an equal-probability rule. If only one candidate runs for the election, this candidate wins with certainty. In this election, voters vote sincerely. Thus, they play only weakly undominated strategies.
We analyze voters' behavior by extending the probabilistic voting model of Persson and Tabellini (2000) . Given the uniform distribution of , the probability that a dynastic candidate wins, denoted as
because the condition for the victory of a dynastic candidate, assuming an interior solution, is We now consider the decision candidates make on whether to run. Candidates are office motivated and rent-seeking. The benefit from holding office is > 0, which is not related to a policy. Candidates also benefit from a rent policy, = . We assume that candidates can obtain if they win. Note that even if candidates obtain a positive benefit that is not the same as , the result does not change as long as they obtain a part of . Candidates announce and commit to the amount of distributions that will be allocated to the growth policy, 1 − , before voting. Denote as the expected benefit of a type-j candidate. Then, the respective expected benefits of dynastic and non-dynastic candidates are
If dynastic and non-dynastic candidates decide to run, they have to pay the cost of running, and , respectively. We assume that the cost is higher for non-dynastic candidates than for dynastic candidates (i.e., < ). This assumption is drawn from some observable features of dynastic candidates. First, dynastic candidates can inherit a well-organized support group from their parent.
The support group helps candidates mobilize voters in elections. Second, dynastic candidates can inherit financial resources from their parent. Third, constituents easily recognize the name of dynastic candidates (Feinstein, 2010) . 9 These advantages decrease the cost of running for dynastic candidates, but increase the cost of running for competing non-dynastic candidates. We call this assumption the electoral advantage.
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In addition, we assume the following:
This assumption means that a dynastic candidate decides to run even if this candidate has no bargaining advantage ( = 1).
11 If this assumption is dropped, there may exist an unrealistic equilibrium in which no one runs.
Equilibrium 2.2.1 Legislative Bargaining
We begin by analyzing legislative bargaining. As mentioned previously, we consider an ultimatum game: if a proposal is not approved, the game ends, and each member receives ̅ . This means that the agenda setter proposes ̅ to each member of the majority coalition, and keeping all the remaining resources (1 − (L − 1) ̅ /2 > ̅ ), which the other members approve (see Proposition 1 of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) ). Thus, legislators who are not in the majority coalition cannot get anything ( = 0) if a proposal is approved. Accordingly, the expected values of the distribution for the district are 10 The following story is a typical example of the electoral advantage dynastic candidates enjoy. Shinzo Abe ran for the Lower House election in 1993 within the Yamaguchi 1st district that his father, Shintaro Abe, represented until his death in 1991. In the four-seat SNTV (single non-transferable vote) district, he had to compete against three incumbents and two challengers, who were a member of his father's faction. Abe won a seat with almost the same number of votes his father received in his last election by using the abundant electoral resources Abe inherited from his father. Those resources included (1) political funds transferred to Abe without tax through registered political funding organizations; (2) the list of local support group members with which a large-scale canvassing campaign was conducted by a team of his father's former secretaries; (3) personal connections with major political and economic figures who came over to his district to help his campaign; and (4) his mother who helped Abe mobilize potential supporters as a widow of the late husband by appealing to the emotion of the electorate. 11 When = 1, = , and = = 1/(4 ²) from (8) and (9). Thus, from this assumption, the expected benefits of a dynastic candidate are higher than the cost of running.
The first term is the expected payoff to be an agenda setter, and the second term is the expected payoff to be a member of the majority coalition. The district with a dynastic legislator is expected to obtain more benefits than the one with a non-dynastic legislator. That is, > . As α increases, increases and decreases. In other words, the larger bargaining power of dynastic legislators results in a larger allocation of benefits to their districts.
Campaign Platform and Election Returns
Given the predicted outcomes of legislative bargaining, we next consider the size of in the campaign platform and the expected vote share. To ensure interior solutions for ∈ (0,1) for = , , we assume that
In other words, the value of is not too high or too low. Without this assumption, = 0 or 1 in equilibrium.
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By differentiating in (2) and (3) 
12 To be precise, if ( − )/3 ≥ 1/(2 ) − , a non-dynastic candidate announces = 0. If −( − )/3 ≥ 1/(2 ) − , = 0. When the value of is too high, the probability of winning increases significantly with a slight decrease of , thus, candidates set = 0. If ( + 2 )/3 < 1/(2 ) − < (2 + )/3, = 1 and < 1. If (2 + )/3 < 1/(2 ) − , = = 1. When is too low, even though a candidate decreases the value of , the probability of winning does not increase as much. In this case, candidates do not want to decrease .
After substituting ( , ) for * and * in the third line of (1), the probability that a dynastic candidate wins in equilibrium becomes * ≡ 1 2 + 3 ( − ).
Given Assumption 2, * ∈ (0,1). The expected vote share of a dynastic candidate is
since the mean of is zero.
Next, substitute (4), (5), and (6) into in (2) and (3). Then, the expected benefits of dynastic and non-dynastic candidates in equilibrium are:
Thus, the ratio of rent, the probability of winning, the expected vote share, and the expected benefit are higher for a dynastic candidate than for a non-dynastic candidate because > .
Endogenous Candidates
Building on the analyses discussed above, we now derive conditions for potential candidates to run in equilibria. First, suppose that no candidates run in the district. Then, the expected payoff for potential candidates is zero. If a dynastic candidate decides to run, this candidate will spend all of the distribution as own rent ( = 1) and win with certainty, so the expected payoff is + − . Since + is the highest possible expected benefit, (4) and (5), respectively. The dynastic candidate's probability of winning is * , defined by (6).
Theoretical Implications
We can draw three empirical predictions from our model. First, our model of legislative bargaining predicts the following hypothesis:
H1 Dynastic legislators bring more distributions to their districts than do non-dynastic legislators.
Second, the model leads to predicting an election outcome. The probability that a dynastic candidate wins in a competitive district is given by (6), which is always higher than 1/2. The expected vote share is given by (7), which is also higher than 1/2. In contrast, a non-dynastic candidate's probability of winning in a competitive district is lower than 1/2. In the dynastic district, a dynastic candidate will win with certainty. Drawing on these results, we expect that:
13 Suppose that only a non-dynastic candidate runs. This candidate will set = 1, winning with certainty and obtaining an expected payoff of + . If a dynastic candidate deviates and runs, the dynastic candidate's payoff changes from zero to * − . From Assumption 1, < 1/(4ξ²) < * . Thus, the dynastic candidate always has an incentive to deviate and run. Therefore, such an equilibrium does not exist.
H2 Dynastic candidates enjoy a higher probability of winning and a higher vote share than non-dynastic candidates do.
Third, we examine the economic consequences of electing dynastic and non-dynastic candidates.
As mentioned previously, we interpret (= (1 − ) ) as a growth policy aimed at improving the socioeconomic infrastructure and expanding job opportunities within the district, leading to higher economic performance. Electing dynastic legislators should result in higher economic performance than electing non-dynastic legislators because dynastic legislators bring more allocations (i.e., the larger amount of ) to their districts. Importantly, this relationship holds only in a competitive district, where dynastic legislators generate a higher expected amount of spending on policy than non-dynastic legislators do (i.e., (1 − * ) > (1 − * ) ). 14 On the other hand, electing dynastic legislators in the dynastic district results in lower economic performance than when electing non-dynastic legislators in the competitive district. This is because those dynastic legislators set = 1 and win with certainty. In other words, dynastic legislators from the dynastic district only spend the distributive benefits on the limited segment of the electorate, including themselves, in the district, which makes no contribution to the economic performance of the entire district. Taken together, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1 In the competitive district, economic performance is higher when a dynastic legislator is elected than when a non-dynastic legislator is elected. (ii) Economic performance is higher in the competitive district with a non-dynastic legislator than in the dynastic district (with a dynastic
14 Even if a dynastic candidate may be desirable for a particular district, a dynastic candidate is not desirable for the nation. The total amount of resources to be distributed for the districts is limited. Even in the competitive district, dynastic candidates spend more on policy than non-dynastic candidates do. Therefore, at the national level, if the legislature includes more dynastic legislators, more resources will be spent on policy . Thus, the overall economic performance of the nation decreases. This result is important when we consider the normative implication of the presence of dynastic politicians.
legislator).
For our empirical analysis, we have to specify whether dynastic legislators, if elected, are from the dynastic or competitive district. According to Proposition 1, the type of district is determined by * and . We focus on the role of , arguing that the dynastic district appears more likely when is sufficiently high, while the competitive district appears more likely when is low. 15 The value of is strongly influenced by the amount of electoral resources dynastic candidates possess.
This is because a non-dynastic candidate has to spend more on mobilization to challenge the dynastic opponent, who has the larger amount of inherited resources. More resource-rich dynastic candidates increase the campaign costs for non-dynastic candidates, discouraging non-dynastic candidates from running. Note that dynastic candidates are, on average, more resource-rich than non-dynastic candidates, because dynastic candidates can inherit a well-organized support group, financial resources, and name recognition among the constituents from their parent. Thus, a larger gap in electoral resources makes it particularly challenging for non-dynastic candidates to fight against dynastic candidates. In contrast, less-resourceful dynastic candidates lower the campaign cost for non-dynastic candidates.
In short, we predict that the dynastic district appears when dynastic candidates are more resourceful, while the competitive district appears when dynastic candidates are less resourceful. 15 From (9), * depends on and − , all of which are difficult to observe. In contrast, is observable using data.
Empirical Analysis
For empirical tests, we use the data on the members of the Lower House elected between 1996 and 2005 in Japan. 16 We choose the members of the Lower House because it has more legislative power.
After 1996, the Japanese Lower House employs a mixed-member system with 200 members elected under Proportional Representation (PR), and 300 members elected from single-member districts. The number of seats for the PR tier was reduced to 180 for the elections since 2002. Our analysis excludes members elected from the PR tier. In addition, we exclude the period before 1996 from the analysis in order to keep the effect of the electoral system constant.
Fiscal Transfers
We test the first hypothesis by examining the flow of intergovernmental transfers to municipalities.
We use panel data that include biographical and electoral information of the representatives elected for the Lower House in 1996, 2000, 2003, and 2005 , and annual fiscal and socioeconomic information of municipalities between 1997 and 2007. 17 We also present an instrument variable estimation in order to address concerns regarding endogeneity.
We estimate the following model: The vector , includes the characteristics of municipalities such as per capita income, the fiscal strength index, the total size of population, the proportion of population under 15 years old and over 65 years old, the proportion of population in the agricultural sector and service sector, the degree of urbanization, and population density. 20 The financial strength index measures the ratio of municipal financial revenue to financial demand. When the revenue is exactly equal to the anticipated expenditure, the index becomes one. The scores below one indicate that the demand surpasses the revenue, while the scores above one indicate that the revenue surpasses the demand.
The degree of urbanization is measured by the ratio of population living in Density Inhabited 18 The same measure of fiscal transfer is used by Horiuchi and Saito (2003) . 19 See Iida, Ueda, and Matsubayashi (2010) for the historical trend of the presence of dynastic legislators in the Lower House. In this paper, we focus on the inheritance of legislative and electoral advantages within a family, yet other types of inheritance may occur in Japan. For example, the secretaries of politicians often inherit some of these advantages from their bosses. 20 The per capita income, population size, and population density are logged in the following analysis. The population-related variables (except for total population) are only available every five years and we linearly interpolated the values for non-census years.
Districts (DID). and are municipality and year fixed effects, respectively. , is a municipality-year specific error term. 21 The number of municipalities in Japan was slightly more than 3,300 until about 2003, but since then, the number has dropped to around 1,800 due to large-scale mergers that happened throughout Japan. In total, our municipality-level data include about 30,000 observations for 11 years. The summary statistics of the variables for our regression analysis are reported in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 Here] Table 2 reports the estimation results. The standard errors are clustered by municipalities.
Column (1) in Table 2 shows that municipalities receive more transfers when they are represented by dynastic legislators as compared to when non-dynastic legislators represent them. The difference is estimated to be statistically significant. The coefficient associated with the dynastic legislator dummy in column (1) indicates that municipalities expect a 1.5% increase in the transfer when they are represented by a dynastic legislator. This result offers support for the first hypothesis.
[ Table 2 Here]
This suggests that municipalities receive more transfers from the national government when they are represented by dynastic legislators. However, one may argue that the relationship is spurious.
For example, suppose that an area with a deteriorating economic situation elects a dynastic legislator because it expects him to secure more grants to improve its economic condition. Further, this area may receive more transfers from the government simply because it has greater financial needs. If this is the case, the effect of dynastic legislators is overestimated. Alternatively, one may argue that there is a reverse causality (i.e., our dependent variable determines the presence of dynastic legislators)
because an increase in subsidies enhances the chance of reelecting dynastic legislators who have brought back the money to the district. Finally, suppose that there is an unobservable ability that helps politicians secure more funds to their constituencies. If dynastic politicians tend to have such a trait, our results are likely to be biased because we are unable to include it in the estimation.
We address these potential concerns for endogeneity by using the gender of the previous incumbent's children as an instrumental variable. 22 Specifically, we use the fraction of boys among the predecessor's children. Given that more than 90 percent of Japanese politicians between 1996 and 2007 were males, if a politician has only daughters, he is unlikely to give his seat to one of his children. In fact, among the 124 politicians coded as dynastic in our dataset, only 3 are female.
23
Thus, the fraction of male children of a politician should be highly and positively correlated with the chance of dynastic inheritance of the politician's seat. However, the gender of offsprings (of the previous incumbent) is unlikely to be related to the amount of transfers in the current period. These two properties make it an ideal instrument. Second, if the previous incumbent was from the same party, then we consulted a book called "Jinji
Koshin Roku" that lists the family information of notable people in Japan.
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22 A similar instrument is used in Bennedsen et al. (2007) who study the impact of family CEO successions on corporate performance. 23 Only members elected in single-member districts are included in the calculation. 24 We assume that dynastic politicians belong to the same party as their parent. 25 All members of the Diet are listed in the book, but some members refused to give family information to the Then, we run our first-stage regression as follows:
where , contains all other independent (i.e., exogenous) variables included in (10 suggest that the presence of dynastic legislators has a strong causal impact on the allocation of distributive benefits to municipalities. In short, our instrumental variable estimation also lends support to the hypothesis that dynastic legislators bring more distributive benefits to the district than non-dynastic legislators.
Election Returns
The second hypothesis predicts that dynastic candidates have a higher probability of winning and a higher vote share as compared to non-dynastic candidates. We test this hypothesis by estimating the Table 3 .
[ Table 3 Here] [ Table 4 Here]
Economic Performance
To test the hypothesis on economic performance (H3), we determine whether dynastic legislators are resource-rich or not by using the data on the reported amount of financial resources. Specifically, we rely on the total amount of family assets of dynastic legislators. We assume that more family assets allow dynastic candidates to spend more on campaign activities, which results in a higher cost of campaign for non-dynastic candidates. The data on the assets are available for 1996, 2000, 2003, and 2005 . We code dynastic legislators as rich if their family assets exceed the mean of the reported 28 We computed a difference in the predicted probabilities of winning between a dynastic and a non-dynastic candidate, holding other variables constant.
assets among all legislators, and poor otherwise. 29 Our regression analysis reports that dynastic candidates own more family assets than non-dynastic candidates. Column (1) in Table 5 reports that the difference in the family assets is about 5 million yen, after controlling for several political and demographic attributes. Column (2) in Table 5 shows a similar result wherein dynastic legislators are more resource-rich than non-dynastic legislators when the total amount of campaign revenue is used as a measure of resources.
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[ Table 5 Here]
As a measure of local economic performance, we use the rate of GDP growth in prefectures. We expect that the prefectures represented by dynastic legislators achieve the lower levels of income and GDP growth than the prefectures represented by non-dynastic legislators. In this subsection, we use the prefecture-level data because the data on economic growth are unavailable at the municipality-level.
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We estimate the following model: 
where [ ℎ] , denotes the annual rate of GDP growth in prefecture in year . The 29 The mean is about 11,000,000 yen. 30 The data on campaign revenues are also available for those elected in 1996. The number of observations is 297. 31 As noted above, our analysis using the prefecture-level data reports that prefectures receive more transfers when they are represented by a larger number of dynastic legislators.
right-hand side of (13) includes the lagged rate of growth, the lagged proportions of dynastic and LDP legislators, socioeconomic variables, and fixed effects for prefectures and years. Following prior research on economic growth (Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort, 1996) , we include the lagged dependent variable in the right-hand side. Further, we take the log of the growth rate.
[ . ℎ ] , −2 measures the proportion of dynastic legislators who were elected in prefecture in year − 2 and whose family assets are above the mean of the sample, while
[ . ] , −2 measures the proportion of dynastic legislators who were elected in prefecture in year − 2 whose family assets are below the mean. [ . ℎ ] , −3 and
[ . ] , −3 are similarly defined. We use lags at − 2 and − 3 because there should be a time lag before projects and government investment can affect local economic performance. Legislators at determine the amount of transfers at + 1, which then affects the rate of income and GDP growth at + 2 or later. Further, these lags also minimize the possibility of the reverse causality between the presence of dynastic legislators and economic performance. In order to calculate the proportions of resource-rich and resource-poor dynastic legislators, we first code each member of the Diet for their dynastic status. Once a legislator's family background is coded, we simply sum the number of resource-rich and resource-poor dynastic legislators using their assets in prefecture k in year − 2 (or − 3) and divide it by the total number of lawmakers in prefecture .
We expect β 1 and β 2 to be negative and β 3 and β 4 to be positive. We also include [ . ] , −2 and Equation (13) includes a measure of fiscal transfers from the national government to prefectures.
We use a log of the total amount of government transfers per capita at − 1 and − 2. We assume that fiscal transfers are expected to improve the GDP growth rate. Thus, the coefficients associated Table 6 .
[ Table 6 Here] Table 7 reports the estimated results. We first check that the amount of fiscal transfers is positively correlated with the GDP growth rate. We include all non-political variables in the equation and estimate the impact of fiscal transfers. Column (1) of Table 7 indicates that the amount of transfers at − 2 has a positive relationship with the GDP growth rate, while the amount at − 1 has no statistically significant impact on the growth rate. This result offers evidence in support for our assumption that fiscal transfers have a lagged positive impact on local economic performance.
[ Table 7 Here]
Next, we turn to our analysis of how the presence of dynastic legislators affects the GDP growth rate. Column (2) reports the estimated result for the third hypothesis. The proportion of rich 32 As in the previous analysis, GDP, population size, and population density are logged in the following analysis. The population-related variables (except for total population) are only available every five years and we linearly interpolated values for the non-census years.
dynastic legislators with more family assets at − 3 has a negative and statistically significant impact on the rate of GDP growth. On the other hand, the proportion of poor dynastic legislators with less family assets at − 3 has a negative but not statistically significant impact. The proportions of rich and poor dynastic legislators at − 2 have no statistically significant impacts on economic growth. 33 Column (3) indicates that the result for rich dynastic legislators holds even after the impact of fiscal transfers is controlled.
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The negative coefficient associated with [ . ℎ ] , −3 suggests that dynastic legislators elected from the dynastic district suppress the rate of economic growth by spending the distributive benefits in an inefficient manner. In short, dynastic legislators suppress local economic performance despite the fact they deliver a larger amount of distributive benefits to their districts.
More distributive benefits improve local economic performance, yet dynastic legislators spend the distributive benefits inefficiently, which in turn suppresses the growth rate in their districts.
Conclusion
This paper offer several notable findings. First, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district than non-dynastic legislators. Second, dynastic candidates enjoy higher electoral success.
Third, most importantly, as compared to the districts electing non-dynastic legislators, the districts electing dynastic legislators with abundant resources display lower economic performance.
This study makes two contributions. First, our analysis shows that the types of politicians play an important role in the democratic policy-making process. Politicians are characterized by different abilities, resources, and preferences. Their personal characteristics constrain how they act in the policy-making process, resulting in different policy choices. The findings in this study suggest that exclusive attention to institutional structures does not always advance our understanding of 33 The proportion of dynastic legislators at − 1 has no significant impact on economic performance. The results hold even when the average margin of victory and number of previous wins are included in the models. 34 The results hold even if we take into account the amount of resources of non-dynastic legislators.
democratic policy making. In addition, along with other previous works, this study shows that the citizen candidate model offers a useful framework for analyzing the role of politician types.
Second, our research implies that political dynasties have a negative consequence for democratic policy making. Dynastic politicians may be socially inefficient because their electoral advantage deters non-dynastic candidates from running for office, even if constituents prefer non-dynastic candidates to dynastic ones. Further, the large presence of dynastic legislators may result in less optimal policies for the majority of Japanese citizens. A similar discussion can be applied to other countries with a considerable presence of political dynasties.
Agendas for future research include extending our model to predict the behavior of other politicians with electoral and bargaining advantages. In Japan, former local politicians and politicians'
secretaries are likely to have characteristics similar to dynastic candidates. 35 It is also important to study other countries with the large presence of dynastic politicians to generalize our findings that are entirely drawn from Japan. 35 Former local politicians are likely to have an electoral advantage in the district, but unlikely to have a bargaining advantage in the legislature. According to our model, a lack of one of these advantages will reduce cases with the dynastic equilibrium. Politicians' secretaries may have both the advantages and often inherit a district from their boss. (1), and in the 1996 election in Column (2).
The dependent variable in column (1) is the total asset in 1,000,000 yen, while the dependent variable in column (2) is the total campaign revenue in 1,000,000 yen. The prefecture fixed effects are included in the models. * * p < .05 and * p < .10. Biographical information of legislators: For those elected in 1996, we used the data compiled by Kabashima (2000) . Because Kabashima's data covers only up to1996, we updated his dataset for more recent lawmakers in two ways. As for the conservative members of the Diet, we supplemented the information with the data collected by Asano (2006) otherwise. The municipality and year fixed effects are included in the models. * * p < .05 and * p < .10.
